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STILL A COORDINATED MODEL? MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN 
THE GERMAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
VIRGINIA DOELLGAST*
This paper examines recent changes in collective bargaining and employer strate­
gies in the German telecommunications industry following market liberalization in the 
late 1990s. Germany’s distinctive co-determination and vocational training institutions 
encouraged large firms to adopt employment systems in technician and call center work­
places that relied on high levels of worker skill and discretion. However, organizational 
restructuring is undermining these gains, as firms use outsourcing and the creation of 
subsidiaries to escape or weaken company-level collective agreements. These trends 
have substantially weakened unions and contributed to the further disorganization of 
coordinated bargaining structures. Findings are based on interviews with union and 
works council representatives, managers, and employees at Deutsche Telekom and its 
major competitors conducted between 2003 and 2007, as well as secondary analysis of 
company documents and industry reports.
T n the 1980s and  1990s, the G erm an tele­
com m unications industry  was character­
ized by stable industrial relations institutions 
and high levels o f worker participation  in 
m anagem ent decisions. T he un ion and works 
councils at the fo rm er m onopolist Deutsche 
Telekom (DT) played a central role in guiding 
increm ental adjustm ent to new technologies 
and m ore com petitive m arkets (D arbishire 
1997). D T’s resulting “labor-m ediated” re­
structuring strategies m aintained high wages, 
stable jobs, and  worker skills at a tim e when 
similar firms in the U nited  States and  U nited
*Virginia Doellgast is Lecturer in Comparative Em­
ployment Relations at the London School of Econom­
ics. Field research for this paper was supported by the 
Fulbright Commission, Cornell University’s School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University’s 
Einaudi Center, the Max Planck Institute for the Study 
of Societies, and Technische Universitat Chemnitz, and 
the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. The author thanks 
Owen Darbishire, Ian Greer, Martin Hopner, Harry Katz, 
Jeffrey Keefe, and Peter Ross for valuable comments.
Kingdom  were pursu ing  “m arket-m ediated” 
strategies th a t involved forced layoffs and 
deskilling (Batt and  D arbishire 1997; Katz 
1997).
Developm ents since the late 1990s have 
led to m ore radical changes in the G erm an 
telecom m unications m arket. New regula­
tions in 1998 end ed  D T ’s m onopolies in all 
m arket segments, encouraging the expansion 
o f low-cost service providers with weaker, or 
no, collective agreem ents. DT m anagem ent 
has com e u n d e r increased pressure to m axi­
mize shareho lder value, at the same time that 
it faces declin ing m arket share and  growing 
price-based com petition . T he shift to m ore 
liberalized m arkets, shareho lder-o rien ted  
corporate  governance arrangem ents, and  
non-un ion com petition  represen ts growing 
convergence on the conditions tha t incum ­
b en t providers in liberal m arket countries 
like the U nited  States faced in the 1990s. 
At the same time, o th er institutions have 
proven m ore resilient. G erm any continues 
to have broad  co-determ ination  rights and  a
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“d u a l” app rendcesh ip  system th a t prom otes 
em ployer investm ent in vocational training, 
while un ion  m em bership density and support 
have rem ained  high at DT.
In this paper, I ask how, and to what extent, 
these distinctive institutions have in fluenced 
the recen t restruc tu ring  m easures adop ted  
by large G erm an telecom m unications firms. 
T he findings of this study con tribu te  to con­
tem porary  debates on the ex ten t and  nature  
o f recen t changes in G erm any’s “coord inat­
in g” institutions (for exam ple, Bosch and 
W einkopf 2008; Kitschelt and  Streeck 2004; 
Streeck 2009; T helen  and  van W ijnbergen 
2003). Based on studies o f G erm an m anu­
facturing workplaces in the 1980s, Streeck 
(1991) and  T u rn e r (1991), am ong others, 
argued  th a t sectoral bargain ing with strong 
un ions, workplace-level co-determ ination, 
and  vocational train ing em phasizing polyva­
len t skills constitu ted  productive constraints 
on  firm s th a t p rom oted  social peace while 
enh ancing  corpo rate  perfo rm ance. T he 
m ore recen t litera ture  on national varieties 
o f capitalism  em phasizes com plem entarities 
betw een these institutions and  G erm any’s 
stakeholder-oriented  corporate governance 
arrangem ents, which are argued  to support 
com petitive advantage in quality-focused 
m arkets (Hall and  Soskice 2001).
A growing body of evidence, however, 
suggests th a t b road  trends o f in te rn a tio n ­
alization and  liberalization o f m arkets are 
u n derm in ing  these advantages and  weaken­
ing traditional constraints on m anagem ent. 
G erm an firm s are u n d er pressure to increase 
short-term  re tu rns, in response to the grow­
ing p rop ortio n  of individual shareholders 
and  shareho lder activism by in terna tional 
institutional investors (H opner2003). U nion 
density and  bargaining coverage have de­
clined across sectors, em ployers associations 
are losing m em bers, and concessionary plant- 
level bargaining has increased (Doellgast and 
G reer 2007:57-58). These developm ents 
raise two questions. First, how (if at all) 
do national and  workplace-level industrial 
relations institutions in Germ any con tinue 
to in fluence firm s’ strategic choices u n d er 
conditions of m arket liberalization and  de­
clining un ion  power? Second, to what extent, 
and in what ways, have these institutions been
transform ed by the erosion of traditional sup­
ports for workplace-level bargaining?
Using telecom m unications as a case study, I 
exam ine the process o f change in G erm any’s 
coordinating institutions at the industry level, 
as well as the effects o f m ore stable bargain­
ing structures and  bargaining rights at the 
workplace level, in a setting where this change 
has been  dram atic in recen t years. F indings 
are based on over 150 interviews with un io n  
and  works council representatives, m anagers, 
and  em ployees conducted  betw een 2003 and  
2007, as well as com pany docum ents and  
industry  reports.
Market Liberalization 
and Industry Restructuring
D eutsche Telekom  (DT) was a publicly 
ow ned com pany in the 1980s and  1990s, 
re ta in ing  its m onopolies in long distance 
and  local p h on e  services as well as in the 
growing m obile, In terne t, and  cable m arkets. 
D eregulation and  privatization initially oc­
curred  th rough  a draw n-out series o f legisla­
tive reform s. Post Reform  I w ent in to  effect 
in 1989 and  separated  the postal service, the 
post bank, and  telecom m unications services. 
Mobile and  satellite com m unications were 
opened  to lim ited com petition , bu t DT m ain­
tained its m onopoly in netw ork services. In  
1993, the European Council passed a directive 
calling for m em ber states to elim inate m o­
nopolies on netw ork in frastructure and  voice 
telephony services by 1998. T he G erm an 
governm ent resp on ded  with Post Reform  II 
in 1995, which laid the groundw ork for the 
privatization o f te lecom m unications an d  
postal services. T he DBP-controlled postal 
service, post bank, and  telecom m unications 
services were converted to private co rpo ra­
tions, and  D eutsche Telekom  AG was estab­
lished as a jo in t-stock com pany with 100% 
state ownership.
Despite these changes, as o f the mid-1990s 
DT still con tro lled  a roun d  90% of the data 
services m arket and  90-95%  o f the cable 
network. DT also benefited  from  “asym­
m etrical” regulation  th a t gave it a nu m ber o f 
advantages, with low incentive price regula­
tion and few limitations on cross-subsidization 
or m arket en try  (D arbishire 1997:195-96).
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This changed in 1998, w hen legislation cam e 
into effect th a t end ed  D T ’s rem aining m o­
nopolies and  placed new restrictions on DT 
with the aim  of curbing its m arket power. 
Almost overnight, the G erm an telecom m uni­
cations m arket shifted from  one o f the m ost 
protected  to one o f the m ost liberalized in 
the world. N ational netw ork operators like 
M annesm ann A rcor and  o.tel.o and  sm aller 
utilities and  city carriers like N et Cologne 
and W orldcom /M FS expanded  the ir own 
com peting netw ork in frastructu re, target­
ing lucrative u rban  and corporate networks 
markets. Service providers and  resellers b en ­
efited from  new rules th a t allowed them  to 
sell network capacity from  D eutsche Telekom 
at lower rates.1 Intensified price com petition 
in fixed netw ork com m unications led to 
declining call charges, which fell m ore than 
60% betw een 1998 and  2000, represen ting  
“the steepest cuts in any E uropean  m arket 
for years” (Althaus 2000).2 *
At the same time, DT m anagem ent becam e 
increasingly focused on raising the com pany’s 
lagging share price. In 1996, DT m ade an 
initial public offering (IPO) and  one m illion 
private investors purchased  26% of its stock. 
State ownership was fu rther e roded  following 
second and  th ird  public offerings in 1999 
and 2000. By 2004, the federal governm ent 
directly held  26% of shares, with 17% held  
by the federal Loan Bank for R econstruction; 
and by the en d  o f 2007 the ir jo in t ow nership 
had d rop ped  fu rth e r to 32%. M eanwhile, by 
2002, the price of DT shares had  fallen to less 
than 10% of their peak several years earlier 
(Economist 2002), p rom pting  a class-action 
lawsuit by investors who claimed the com pany 
had been  overvalued w hen new shares were
JBy the end of 1998 there were already over 120 
licenses for voice telephony. By the end of 1999, 262 
licenses for voice telephony services had been awarded 
to operators with their own networks and 365 licenses 
had been awarded for transmission lines, with a total of 
1,700 companies providing telecommunications services 
in Germany. In 2004, the number of licensees had 
grown to 875, with around 2,200 telecommunications 
companies (Deutsche Telekom 1999, 2004).
2By the beginning of 2008, prices for international
calls had been reduced by up to 98% compared to their 
level before liberalization (with variation by destination 
country) (Bundesnetzagentur 2007).
issued in 2000 {Economist 2008). Large insti­
tu tional investors have also begun  playing a 
m ore im portan t role in shaping m anagem ent 
strategy. T he private equity firm  Blackstone is 
believed to have been  particularly influential 
in advising m anagem ent on recen trestructu r­
ing decisions (Schroder 2007).
Despite these changes, the G erm an tele­
com m unications m arket con tinues to be 
influenced by its past developm ent trajectory. 
DT was able to m ain tain  m arket power and 
a diversified corporate  structure, which have 
allowed it to rem ain  the dom inan t provider 
in core segm ents and  in the growing m ulti­
m edia services m arket. It has been  accused 
o f using judicial review to delay or block 
unfavorable regulatory  decisions and  lever­
aging its m arket power to delay provision of 
leased lines and  to in troduce artificially low 
“dum ping  p rices” in certain  m arkets, such 
as DSL (OECD 2004:59-60). M ore recently, 
DT lobbied G erm any’s coalition governm ent 
to exem pt new investm ents in its high-speed 
fiber-optic network, VDSL, from  regulation. 
In 2006, the Bundesnetzagentur, backed by 
the EU, requ ired  DT to offer local loop 
un bu nd lin g  on the network. However, in 
February  2007 a new clause in the G erm an 
T elecom m unications Act cam e in to effect 
th a t exem pted  new m arkets from  regula­
tion, allowing DT to prevent com petitors 
from  gaining full access to m ost o f its fiber­
optic netw ork for a fixed period. T he EU 
Com m ission in stitu ted  breach-of-contract 
proceedings, arguing th a t these provisions 
conflict with the E U ’s legal framework. At 
the tim e o f writing, this conflict had  n o t yet 
been  resolved.
D T ’s role in developing G erm any’s tele­
com m unications in frastructure also has given 
it a sustained com petitive advantage in h igh­
speed in te rn e t services. T he com pany did 
n o t invest in a com peting cable netw ork for 
voice and  in te rne t, instead prom oting  DSL 
services and  expansion o f its high-speed in te­
grated  services digital netw ork (ISDN). DT 
was forced to sell m ajority stakes in its n ine 
regional cable com panies in 2000, following 
the Cable Directive. However, DT tem porar­
ily re ta ined  a “25% plus one vo te” share in 
each o f these com panies, which gave it veto 
rights over m ajor restructu ring  decisions. In
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addition , the d irect custom er connections 
con tinue to be owned and  operated  by a large 
num ber of small private com panies, which has 
m ade it bo th  com plex and  expensive for the 
large cable operators to invest in upgrad ing  
the ir in frastructu re. As a result, the cable 
netw ork has n o t becom e a m ajor com peting 
source o f b road ban d  services, as it has in the 
U nited  States and  the U nited K ingdom .3
Finally, the G erm an telecom m unications 
m arket has been  relatively stable com pared 
to th a t o f o th e r countries. DT suffered from  
a p lum m eting  share price and  revenue losses 
un til 2003, w hen it finally m anaged to tu rn  
a profit. Rapid growth after liberalization 
gave way to consolidation and tighter m argins 
in the early 2000s. However, these growing 
pains were relatively m inor com pared  to 
the accounting  scandals, overbuilding o f 
capacity, and  p lum m eting share price that 
U.S. telecom m unications firms experienced  
at the en d  o f the 1990s. Despite a shift to 
a stronger “shareho lder value” orien ta tion , 
s takeho lder-based  co rp o ra te  governance 
traditions have given banks and  em ployee 
represen ta tives add ition al oversight over 
com pany finances and  investm ent decisions 
(Borsch 2007).
D T ’s con tinued  m arket power and  regula­
tory in fluence have p ro tec ted  the com pany 
to som e ex ten t and  allowed it to m aintain 
a do m inan t m arket position in m ost seg­
m ents. At the same time, it is increasingly 
disadvantaged by its high-cost s truc tu re , 
large fixed in frastructu re investm ents, and 
new regulations th a t seek to curb its m arket 
power. W hile o ther firms can “cherry-pick ,” 
choosing to concentrate on high-value-added 
m arket segm ents, DT has an obligation to 
provide universal service. T he com pany 
has a nu m ber of social obligations tha t cre­
ate additional costs, including its con tinued  
em ploym ent o f Beamten, or civil servants,
3In Germany, only 0.5% of residents in 2006 sub­
scribed to cable broadband services and 16.4% to 
DSL, whereas in the United States, 10.3% subscribed to 
cable broadband and only 8.5% to DSL (OECD 2007). 
However, the cable market in Germany is beginning 
to experience a boom, with the market doubling to 1 
million broadband customers in 2007 (Bundesnetza- 
gentur 2007:77).
who enjoy special rights u n d er G erm an law, 
as well as its negotia ted  com m itm ent to train  
thousands o f new appren tices every year.4 
Only 20% o f appren tices are offered jo bs at 
DT after com pleting th e ir train ing, and  thus 
D T ’s com petitors o r subcontractors enjoy 
spillovers from  this investm ent.5
DT has also been  slow to en te r new m arket 
segm ents. Its fixed netw ork business u n it T- 
Com only began offering in te rn e t telephony, 
or Voice over IP (VoIP), in 2005, long after 
AOL and  F reenet had  developed th e ir own 
services. DT also d id n o t develop a “T riple 
Play” o f VoIP, in te rn e t, an d  b ro a d b a n d  
television services un til th e  en d  o f 2006, 
p ro m p ted  by the  loss o f custom ers to com ­
petito rs. T hese innovations were delayed 
by fears o f sho rt-te rm  revenue loss from  
higher-m arg in  trad itio n a l te lep h o n e  ser­
vices, an d  were im p lem en ted  only a fte r th e  
on line  subsidiary T-O nline was in teg ra ted  
in to  the  fixed line op era tio ns at T-Com. DT 
is cu rren tly  suffering  losses as this segm en t 
con tracts, due  to substitu tion  by m obile  
com m unications and , to a lesser d eg ree , 
in te rn e t te lephony .6
These structural disadvantages and missed 
investm ent opportun ities are increasingly 
h u rting  D T’s com petitive position. Overall, 
D T’s share of the telecom m unications m arket 
(based on revenues) fell from  70% in 1998 
to 61% in 1999, and  th en  to 48% in 2007; its
4Deutsche Telekom employed 12,000 apprentices 
in 2006, with a regular work force of 159,992; thus, ap­
prentices represented close to 8% of employment. In 
comparison, Vodafone offered 300 apprentice positions 
with a regular work force of 9,000, representing just 3% 
of employment.
5Reported apprentice numbers are based on inter­
views and company documents.
6According to the German telecommunications as­
sociation BITKOM, revenues from voice services were 
declining by 1 billion Euros per year by 2006. German 
companies generated 4.5% less revenue from fixed 
network calls, while the mobile communications market 
grew by 2% (Deutsche Telekom 2006). In 2006, 10% 
of German households had a mobile phone, but no 
telephone service (Eurobarometer 2007). The volume 
of calls has changed, as well: in 1999, 92.4% of calls 
were from fixed networks, and 7.6% from mobile, while 
in 2006, 77.6% were from fixed networks, 19.2% from 
mobile, 3% from VoIP, and 0.2% from cable (Bundes- 
netzagentur 2006).
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Figure 1. Change in Deutsche Telekom's Market Share Based on Selected 
Indicators, 1998-2007.
Sources: Deutsche Telekom annual reports and Bundesnetzagentur Jahresbericht (2007).
share in local te lephone services has fallen by 
over 30% since 1998 (See Figure l ) . 7
D T’s m obile subsidiary T-Mobile controls 
around  38% o f the wireless custom er base 
(See Table 1). DT also controls aroun d  
50% of the growing in te rn e t m arket, w here 
it com petes with fixed-network and  in te rn e t 
service providers such as Arcor, Freenet, 
Versatel, and  H ansenet (See Table 2).8 In 
the past few years, DT has faced a m ore rapid  
hem orrhag ing of custom ers, whose num bers 
declined by 1.5 m illion in 2006, and  shrink­
ing n e t profits, which d rop ped  close to 60% 
in the first qu arte r o f 2007.
7DT’s competitors accounted for 45% of domestic and 
78% of long distance “call minutes” in 2007, but only 
24% of telephone channels (including fixed network 
and cable connections) (Bundesnetzagentur 2007:66).
8Although in 2007 DT controlled 49% of the market 
for end-customers in DSL, resellers (selling DT’s DSL 
lines under their own name) controlled 19%—and a 
large portion of these revenues are returned to DT 
(Bundesnetzagentur 2007:75).
Effects o f Restructuring 
on Industrial Relations
These recen t developm ents in the Ger­
m an telecom m unications m arket have had 
w ide-ranging effects on  collective bargaining  
institutions, bo th  at DT and  in the industry 
as a whole. T he D eutsche Postgewerkschaft 
(DPG) opera ted  as a single-com pany en ter­
prise u n io n  in the D eutsche B undespost and  
th en  at DT, and  enjoyed considerable influ­
ence over strategic decision-m aking th rough  
the union-dom inated personnel councils and 
represen ta tion  on the com pany’s advisory 
board . In the 1990s, the DPG con tinued  
to enjoy close relationships with m anagers 
and  works councilors. M em ber density in 
core areas o f the business rem ained  high, at 
a roun d  70-80% . Close to 50% o f the form er 
B undespost’s em ployees were civil servants, 
and  thus enjoyed lifetim e jo b  security along 
with o ther special em ploym ent rights.
In 2001, the DPG m erged with four o ther 
service un ions to form  the conglom erate
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Table 1. Major Wireless Providers, 2006.
Wireless
Provider Ownership
Subscribers 
(Millions)
% of Total 
Subscribers
Revenue 
(Billions of €) Employees
Union
Agreement
T-Mobile DT (Germany) 34.3 38% 8.2 5,700 ver.di
Vodafone Vodafone (UK) 31.6 35% 8.0 9,000 IG Metall
E-plus KPN Mobile (Netherlands) 13.6 15% 2.9 2,200 None
0 2 Telefonica (Spain) 11.6 13% 2.8 4,700 IG BCE
Source: Company web sites, annual reports, and interviews. Subscriber numbers were current as of June 2007; 
Revenue and Employees data are for the end of 2006.
un io n  ver.di, with m ost staff moving to the 
new u n io n ’s telecom m unications and  IT 
division Fachbereich 9 (FB9). U nion m em ber­
ship rem ained  high in traditional areas of 
the business, and  un io n  and  works council 
represen tation  on the com pany’s supervisory 
board  gave ver.di con tinued  influence over 
corporate  strategy.
However, ver.di has been  less successful in 
growing industry  segm ents. Because DT was 
a m onopoly, collective bargaining was tradi­
tionally organized at the enterprise level, with 
no em ployers association or industry-level 
agreem ent. T he un ion attem pted to establish 
sectoral bargain ing following liberalization, 
b u t it was unable to do so for several reasons. 
First, the DPG, and  then  ver.di, con tinued  to 
be viewed as the un io n  o f D eutsche Telekom . 
Local exchange carriers and  com peting n e t­
work operators were unwilling to cooperate 
with the fo rm er m onopolist o r its un ion , 
which placed a priority on pro tecting  D T ’s 
m arket position; and  the em ployees o f these 
firm s were wary o f jo in in g  a un io n  tha t 
rep resen ted  DT em ployees’ interests. D T ’s 
com petitors fo rm ed the Association o f Tele­
com m unications and  Value-Added Service 
Providers ( VATM) , bu t m em bersh ip rem ains 
voluntary and  the association has n o t sought 
to engage in collective bargaining.
Second, the DPG faced com petition from  
o ther un ions as it sought to organize new 
workplaces. As firms in the public, metalwork­
ing, chem ical, and  energy sectors diversified 
into telecom m unications and IT, their unions 
negotiated  agreem ents with these new busi­
ness units. Today ver.di’s only agreem ents 
outside of DT are with cable providers for­
merly ow ned by DT, such as Kabel D eutsch­
land, and  with city carriers like N etCologne
th a t had  agreem ents with the fo rm er public 
sector un io n  otv (See Table 3).
R estructuring exacerbated  the com peti­
tion am ong unions, particularly betw een the 
m etalw orking un io n  IG Metall and  the new 
conglom erate service un ion  ver.di. Those two 
un ions bo th  negotia ted  separate agreem ents 
with d ifferen t operating  subsidiaries o f the 
DT g ro u p ’s com pany T-Systems, which was 
form ed w hen D T’s telecom m unications and  
IT service division m erged with Debis Sys- 
tem haus, a service division o f the au tom aker 
Daim lerChrysler. D T ’s m ajor fixed netw ork 
com petitor, Arcor, was form ed th ro ug h  the 
m ergers o f subsidiaries th a t had  separate 
agreem ents with IG Metall, T ransnet, and  IG 
BCE. In 2000, the un ions form ally divided 
responsibility for new telecom m unications 
and  IT com panies. However, this has n o t 
p reven ted  conflict at a tim e o f declin ing 
m em bersh ip  and  changing firm  boundaries. 
For exam ple, ver.di had  agreed th a t the m et­
alworking firm  M annesm ann’s m obile ph on e  
subsidiary D2 M annesm ann M obilfunk fell 
un der IG M etall’sjurisdiction, bu t changed its 
position after the British telecom m unications 
com pany Vodafone took over M annesm ann. 
T hesejurisdictional conflicts have preven ted  
the un ions from  developing a coo rd in a ted  
strategy at the industry  level and  divided 
works councils at the com pany level.
A th ird  challenge to establishing sectoral 
bargain ing has been  the persistence o f low 
un io n  density in new industry  segm ents. 
Most small service re-sellers and  in te rn e t 
service providers have n o t negotia ted  un io n  
agreem ents. L arger com petitors were estab­
lished e ither by in terna tional firms th a t d id  
n o t have a p rio r relationsh ip  with G erm an 
un ions or by diversified G erm an firm s th a t
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Table 2. Major Fixed-Line Providers, 2006.
DSL % Total Voice % Total Revenue
Subscribers DSL Subscribers Voice (Billions Union
Provider Ownership (Millions) Subscribers (Millions) Subscribers of€) Employees Agreement
T-Home DT (Germany) 7.7 49% 33.2 61% 21.8 86,315 ver.di
Arcor Vodafone (UK) 2.1 14% 4.1 8% 2.1 3,735 Transnet/ 
IG Me tall
Freenet Freenet (Germany) 1.0 7% 3.0 6% 2.1 3,646 None
Versatel Versatel (Germany) 0.5 3% 0.1 0.1% 0.7 1,395 ver.di
Source: Company web sites, annual reports, and interviews. Subscriber numbers are based on reports by companies 
in reporting year 2006 or 2006/2007. Calculations of percentages are based on 14.4 million total DSL subscribers 
and 54.5 million voice subscribers in 2006 (Bundesnetzagentur 2007).
were re luc tan t to negotiate new agreem ents 
for their telecom m unications subsidiaries. 
D2 M annesm an M obilfunk began negotia­
tions with IG Me tall in the mid-1990s, bu t 
did no t conclude a collective agreem ent until 
2001, after the com pany was taken over by 
Vodafone. M em bership has rem ained  low, 
at a round  5%, and  in some regions works 
councilors have broken off all ties with the 
union. Employees at the wireless provider 
E-plus elected works councils in the late 1990s 
with ver.di’s assistance, bu t as o f 2009 un ion  
m em bership still rem ained  low, un ion  affilia­
tion of the works councilors was fragm ented , 
and there  had  been  no progress toward an 
agreem ent.
These th ree  factors— distrust by new em ­
ployers o f D T’s close relationsh ip  with the 
DPG, com petition  betw een unions, and  low 
union m em bership in new segments— help to 
explain the con tinued lack o f a sectoral agree­
ment. More surprisingly, the DPG also has no t 
negotiated a com m on fram ework agreem ent 
for the com panies in D T ’s corporate group, 
where the un io n  continues to have a strong 
and institu tionalized  bargain ing  re la tion­
ship with m anagem ent. As DT transitioned 
from  a fixed netw ork carrier to a diversified 
corporate g roup in the 1990s, the com pany 
established in d ep en d en t subsidiaries for dif­
feren t m arket and  service segm ents. In 2000, 
DT shifted to a new divisional structure, based 
on its four m arket “pillars” o f T-Com (fixed 
netw ork), T-Mobile (wireless), T-Systems 
(business and IT ), and T-Online (in terne t ser­
vices) . T-Com rem ained  an in terna l division 
of the p a ren t company, D eutsche Telekom
AG, and  thus rem ained  u n d er the com pany’s 
original collective agreem ent. However, the 
DPG concluded  separate agreem ents with 
T-Mobile and  T-Systems and  was unsuccess­
ful in securing an agreem ent with T-Online.
N egotiations betw een ver.di and  T-Online 
end ed  in 2005 w hen DT ann ou nced  tha t it 
would bring  the subsidiary back in to the par­
en t com pany to take advantage o f synergies 
betw een in te rn e t and  netw ork services, re­
b rand ing  T-Com as “T-H om e.” At the same 
time, the group within T-Com servicing small 
and  m edium -sized com panies m erged with 
T-System’s large business custom ers group to 
create a new business custom er division. DT 
has also established a nu m ber o f subsidiaries 
tha t perfo rm  cross-divisional m anagem ent 
functions o r operating  activities, and  these 
are e ither covered by the p aren t com pany 
agreem ent (often with un ique term s) or by 
separate agreem ents. Ver.di representatives 
estim ated in 2007 that there were over 100 col­
lective agreem ents across Deutsche Telekom.
This fragm entation  of collective bargain­
ing within DT can be partially explained by 
the b road er developm ents in the telecom ­
m unications industry  discussed above. Ver. 
di m em bersh ip  and  works council ties have 
rem ained weaker in business units com peting 
in new er m arket segments: un io n  density is 
a roun d  70-80%  in the p a ren t company, bu t 
is estim ated to be 10-20% at T-Mobile and 
T-Systems, and  was close to 5% at T-Online 
before it was re-in tegrated  in to  the p aren t 
company.
Sako and  Jackson (2006:356-58) provide 
two additional explanations th a t are specific
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Table 3. Selected Company Agreements in Telecommunications, 2006.
Responsible Trade Union Company Agreement
Transport, Service and Networks Union (Transport, 
Service, Netze— Transnet) Arcor
Chemicals, Energy and Mining Union 
(Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau Chemie Energie— 
IG BCE)
02 , British Telecom
Metalworkers’ Union (Industriegewerkschaft Metall— 
IG Metall) Vodafone, Arcor
Service Employees’ Union (Vereintedienstleistungs- 
gewerkschaft—ver. di) Deutsche Telekom (Deutsche Telekom AG, T-Mobile, T-Systems Business Services, T-Systems Enterprise Services, 
Vivento Customer Services, Vivento Technical Services, 
T-Punkt, DeTelmmobilien, T-Service, and other agreements 
for smaller subsidiaries), Versatel, EWE TEL, 
NetCologne, DOKom, Kabel Deutschland, Kabel 
Baden-Wiirttemberg
to DT. First, the un ion  m erger tha t form ed 
ver.di d ra in ed  resources and  diverted a tten ­
tion from  new er DT operations, ham pering  
m em bership recru itm en t and  allowing works 
councils in these operations to assume a m ore 
central and  in d ep en d en t role. Second, pay 
and  working conditions in the new business 
units were initially b e tte r than  those at the 
p a ren t company, as DT sought to encourage 
em ployees to accept transfers as well as to at­
tract new em ployees with technical skills tha t 
were in h igh dem and. Works councils and  
em ployees in the subsidiaries thus had  bo th  
the m eans and  the incentive to m aintain a 
structure  o f separate agreem ents.
A fu rther explanation for D T’s fragm ented 
collective agreem ents is its un ique history 
o f en terp rise  unionism . Because the DPG 
negotia ted  with only one employer, it had  
established a tradition  o f form al collective 
bargaining on a nu m ber of topics tha t are 
typically included  in works agreem ents in 
o th e r sectors, such as scheduling practices 
and  variable com pensation . As m anage­
m ent sought to differen tia te these practices, 
un ion  representatives p re fe rred  to negotiate 
separate agreem ents ra ther than shift respon­
sibility to works councils th rough  opening  
clauses. This trad ition  was a source o f labor 
streng th  in the 1970s and  1980s, based on 
an unusually close relationsh ip between the 
works councils and  a single-em ployer union. 
However, as DT has decentralized  its own
corporate  structure, the form erly close rela­
tionships between works councils in d ifferen t 
areas o f the business have b roken  down. 
U nion and  works council representatives 
are now jointly responsible for adm inistering 
increasingly com plex collective agreem ents. 
T he corporate  g ro u p ’s works council plays a 
relatively weak role, dealing prim arily with 
decisions th a t affect the entire  group, while 
company-level works councils have prim ary 
responsibility for negotiating  agreem ents on  
such m atters as work design, jo b  security, and  
com pensation  practices th a t are n o t covered 
in agreem ents with ver.di. As a result, ver.di 
has found  it increasingly difficult to coord i­
nate bargaining and  participate in strategic 
decision-m aking at the corporate group level.
Figures for m em bersh ip  density and  bar­
gaining coverage in the G erm an telecom m u­
nications industry  are n o t publicly available, 
and  thus can only be roughly estim ated. In 
2006, ver.di representatives claim ed to have 
70% density in D eutsche T elekom ’s broad- 
b an d /fix ed  netw ork operations and  h ead ­
quarters (with a roun d  115,000 em ployees), 
an average o f 40% in D T ’s o ther subsidiaries 
(45,000 em ployees), and  5% in new industry  
entran ts (56,000 em ployees).9 U nion density
9DT reported a total of 159,992 employees in its Ger­
man operations, of whom 86,315 were in Broadband/ 
Fixed Network (T-Com/T-Home) and 28,188 in Head- 
quarters/Shared Services—leaving 45,489 employees
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was thus at m ost 47% in 2006, falling from  
an estim ated 57% in the mid-1990s (Funk 
2004). Coverage o f em ployees by firm-level 
collective agreem ents is still high, due to D T’s 
con tinued high share o f industry  em ploy­
m ent. Based on similarly rough  calculations, 
it appears to have fallen from  close to 100% 
to around  85% .10 However, these figures do 
not take in to  account the large and  growing 
proportion  of custom er service, sales, and 
technician jobs perform ed by third-party sub­
contractors, which have lower u n io n  density 
and are typically no t covered by collective 
agreem ents— a tren d  tha t is discussed in 
greater detail below.
In the absence of sectoral bargaining, 
works councils have assum ed central respon­
sibility for negotiating  collective agreem ents 
in many new workplaces. However, works 
councils have n o t built strong relationships 
with the un io n  outside o f D T ’s fixed network 
business. Works councilors at d ifferen t loca­
tions in large firms often do n o t know each 
o ther due to freq uen t restructu ring , and 
m em bership in company-level works councils 
changes often as divisions are spun off and 
as fo rm er com petitors m erge. Moreover, in 
diversified firms like M annesm ann and  DT, 
works councils located in d ifferen t business 
units often have distinct or conflicting in ter­
ests (H opner and  Jackson 2003; Sako and  
Jackson 2006).
M arket liberalization and  corporate re­
structuring have thus con tribu ted  to the 
fragm entation o f collective bargaining in 
the telecom m unications industry. Today DT 
faces com petition  across m arket segm ents 
from firms with weaker or no  collective agree­
m ents. M eanwhile, ver.di representatives
in the company’s other subsidiaries (DT annual report, 
2006). The Bundesnetzagentur (2006) estimated tele­
communications employment in mid-2006 as 55,900 at 
DT’s competitors.
10The major telecommunications companies with 
collective agreements in 2006 included the DT group 
(159,992 employees), Arcor (3,735 employees), Voda­
fone (9,000 employees), 0 2  (4,700), Kabel Deutschland 
(2,700), Versatel (1,395), EWE TEL (950), and Net- 
Cologne (700). This represented 183,172 employees 
covered by an agreement, out of total employment of 
215,892. Official statistics on union membership are 
not available.
are struggling to develop new approaches 
to regulating working conditions in a m ore 
com petitive sector, w ithout the institutional 
m oorings o f a sectoral bargain ing structure 
o r a com m on fram ew ork agreem ent at DT.
Employment Systems
Growing fragm entation  in industrial rela­
tions and  m ore d ifferen tia ted  m arkets p ro ­
vide greater scope for m anagers to exercise 
strategic choice as they seek to reorganize 
work and  im plem ent new perform ance m an­
agem ent systems. As m arkets reach satura­
tion, bo th  DT and its com petitors increasingly 
seek to a ttract and  re ta in  custom ers, which 
creates incentives to invest in service qual­
ity. At the same time, growing price-based 
com petition  and  declin ing profit m argins 
in troduce potentially conflicting pressures 
to reduce labor costs. New technologies 
increase the com plexity o f m any jobs, bu t 
also facilitate rationalization, rou ting  o f calls 
to rem ote locations, and  individual perfo r­
m ance m onitoring.
The following section focuses on the em ­
ploym ent practices th a t G erm an em ployers 
adop ted  as they sought to respond  to these 
c o n tra d ic to ry  p ressu res an d  incen tives, 
drawing on case study data from  D eutsche 
Telekom ’s two largest business units, T-Com 
(fixed network) and  T-Mobile (wireless), and 
from  two o f its m ajor com petitors, A rcor 
(fixed netw ork) and  Vodafone G erm any 
(wireless)—both  o f which are owned by the 
British m ultinational Vodafone. Case studies 
were conducted  in two m ajor areas o f tele­
com m unications em ploym ent: technicians 
and  custom er service and  sales workers, with 
a particu lar focus on call centers.
Technicians. Technicians are responsible 
for constructing  and  m ain tain ing networks, 
bo th  for private custom ers and  for large busi­
nesses, as well as installing and  repairing lines 
and  services. H ere I focus on technicians at 
T-Com and  Arcor, where these jobs rep resen t 
a m ajor occupational group  (in contrast 
to the m obile com panies, which em ploy a 
sm aller nu m ber of specialized techn icians). 
DT owns m ost o f G erm any’s in frastructu re 
(83% o f te lephone channels in 2006), which
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is th en  leased or resold by com petitors; and 
its technicians are responsible for m ain tain­
ing and  servicing bo th  this fixed netw ork 
and  a large p rop o rtio n  of G erm any’s wire­
less network. Even w here com petitors own 
th e ir own network, DT typically services the 
“last m ile ,” or the connection  betw een the 
d istribu tion  po in t and  the custom er. This 
m eans th a t the m ajority o f telecom m unica­
tions technicians are em ployed by DT—for 
exam ple, while D T’s service regions typically 
em ploy over 1,000 technicians, similar A rcor 
regions em ploy less than  100.
At T-Com, there were four m ain jo b  catego­
ries: Monteur h an d led  simple connections 
and  p rod uc t assembly; Service Monteur and  
Service Technikerwere responsible for m ain te­
nance and  repair; and  Service TechnikerSpezial 
built and m aintained large business networks. 
Alm ost all o f these em ployees had  com pleted 
appren ticesh ip  train ing in the Systemelektroni- 
ker/in trade, and  m ost received the ir train ing 
at DT. A rcor had  a similar division between 
its System Spezialistin, Professional System Spe- 
zialistin, and  Senior System Spezialistin. The 
m ajority o f technicians were tra ined  in the 
m ore unusual occupation o f Facharbeiter fu r  
Nachrichtentechnik due to the com pany’s p rio r 
ow nership by the Deutsche Bahn. T-Com 
con tinued  to offer appren ticesh ip  places in 
technician  trades, and  m ade a com m itm ent 
in its collective agreem ent with ver.di to 
h ire  a p rop o rtio n  of these appren tices in to 
p e rm an en t positions every year (currently  
a roun d  80). In contrast, A rcor d id no t offer 
appren ticesh ip  places, instead h iring  techni­
cians who received train ing elsewhere. The 
con ten t o f jobs also differed: DT technicians 
typically perfo rm ed  a wider variety of tasks 
associated with servicing custom er connec­
tions, while A rcor technicians were prim arily 
responsible for large business custom ers and 
netw ork m ain tenance.
W ork organ ization  in bo th  com panies 
changed over the 1990s, due to new tech­
nologies th a t facilitated the tracking and  
d istribu tion  o f jobs. Previously supervisors 
would m eet with em ployees each m orn ing  
to distribu te assignm ents; today, technicians 
prim arily work alone, and  alljob assignm ents 
are allocated over the in te rn e t th rough  per­
sonal laptops. At T-Com, em ployees m et
with “virtual team s” o f 17 to 20 technicians 
at least once a m on th  to discuss team  goals 
and  to receive train ing  on new products. 
M anagem ent in troduced  team  com petitions, 
bu t these were op tional and  did n o t affect bo­
nuses un til recently (which will be discussed 
below ). Employees also had  working tim e 
accounts and flexible working hours, allowing 
them  to start up  to half an h o u r early and  
to work up  to 10 hours p e r day. A dditional 
hours were accum ulated  in their accounts, 
and  technicians negotia ted  individual plans 
with team  leaders for “drawing dow n” these 
accounts by the end  o f the year th ro ug h  
reduced  hours. All o f these changes were 
negotia ted  with strong works councils, which 
resisted the in troduction  o f pay-at-risk, p ro ­
tected em ployees from  electronic m on ito r­
ing, and  ensu red  th a t individual technicians 
m ain tained broad  contro l over their working 
time arrangem ents. T-Com’s technicians thus 
traditionally enjoyed considerable autonomy, 
with few substantive consequences o r in cen­
tives a ttached to m eeting perform ance goals.
At Arcor, work was organized similarly, b u t 
with less use o f teams: technicians typically 
worked alone and  m ost com m unication  oc­
cu rred  betw een individual em ployees and  
th e ir  reg ional d ispatcher, who alloca ted  
jobs, approved individual schedules, an d  
p lann ed  training. W orking tim e accounts 
allowed technicians to accum ulate only 10 
“p lus” or “m inus” hours, and  em ployees had  
less individual con tro l over use o f accounts. 
In addition , A rcor technicians had  a larger 
com p onen t of variable pay based exclusively 
on individual bonuses. O nce a year, a supervi­
sor evaluated perfo rm ance in several areas, 
and  em ployees received a bonus paym ent 
based on “po in ts” received, am ounting  to, 
on average, 5% to 10% o f total pay. W hile 
work was m ore individualized than  at T-Com, 
A rcor technicians also enjoyed high levels 
o f autonom y and  relative status w ithin the 
company. U nion and  works council agree­
m ents provided extensive protections; for 
exam ple, individuals were able to con test 
bonus evaluations, and  there  were strong 
negotia ted  limits on m onitoring.
Customer service and sales. Service and  
sales jo bs— prim arily in retail stores and  call
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centers— have becom e m ore im p ortan t as a 
strategic channel for attracting and  retain ing 
customers. These jobs are expand ing at all 
telecom m unications com panies, bu t make up 
a larger p rop o rtio n  o f em ploym ent at D T’s 
m ajor com petitors than  at DT, particularly 
am ong service resellers, which do n o t m ain­
tain the ir own infrastructure.
Form al vocational train ing continues to 
be im portan t for recru itm en t and  prom otion 
in service and  sales jobs, a lthough  this varies 
across firms. DT offered an apprenticeship in 
retail sales, o r Kaufleute im Einzelhandel, in its 
retail subsidiary T-Punkt, which represen ted  
16% of its total appren tice  places in 2006. 
While o th er firms offered this train ing, they 
did so at a lower rate, and  typically adjusted 
the nu m ber o f new appren tice places based 
on their rec ru itm en t needs. Call cen ter 
agents at DT traditionally com pleted  the 
apprenticeship training Kaufleute fu r  Biirokom- 
munikation (M anagem ent Assistant in Office 
C om m unications), which was n o t specific to 
call centers, thus offering m obility to o ther 
jobs in the com pany and  sector. Its com ­
petitors and  call cen ter subcontractors, in 
contrast, recru ited  em ployees from  a variety 
of backgrounds, with a heavy reliance on 
students; and  m any did n o t fund  ap p ren ­
ticeship training. In 2006, a new call cen ter 
apprenticeship , Kaufleute fu r  Dialogmarketing, 
was negotiated  betw een ver.di, the DGB, and 
the em ployers’ organization Kuratorium der 
Deutschen Wirtschaftfur Berufsbildung (KWB), 
with the cooperation  of several large call 
center vendors. A ccording to un io n  rep re ­
sentatives, close to 90% o f train ing for the 
new appren ticesh ip  takes place in the firm, 
m aking it less costly than o th e r app ren tice­
ship courses th a t involve m ore extensive 
classroom training. Employers have argued 
that the new appren ticesh ip  will help  to raise 
the status o f call center work and  improve skill 
portability. However, u n ion  and  works coun­
cil representatives at DT felt it rep resen ted  
a devaluing o f the broad  skills provided in 
the previous apprenticeship , and would serve 
to fu rth er segregate call cen ter agents and 
reduce m obility w ithin DT.
Call centers have also been  a central focus 
of work reorganization  m easures. New tech­
nologies have m ade it easier to rou te  calls
betw een rem ote locations and  to subcontrac­
tors, m atch agen t availability with fluctuating 
call volume, and m onitor agent perform ance. 
These jobs rep resen t a large p rop o rtio n  of 
em ploym ent, averaging a roun d  30% o f jobs 
in the largest com panies, and  thus provide 
an obvious target for reducing  labor costs. 
A lthough the com panies studied here—T- 
Com, T-Mobile, Arcor, and  Vodafone— have 
adop ted  d ifferen t practices, all four m oved 
toward a similar em ploym ent system in the 
early 2000s th a t relied  on worker skill and 
discretion.
First, all four com panies increased the 
com plexity of call cen ter jobs. In 1999, 
T-Com re tra ined  agents to handle  a range 
of billing, sales, com plaints, telem arketing, 
and  service calls. T-Mobile also gradually re­
duced specializations, although it m aintained 
ded icated  groups for high- and  low-value 
custom er segments. Arcor and Vodafone had 
m ore specializations, b u t pay and  working 
conditions were n o t d ifferen tia ted  based on 
call type and  m obility across jobs was high. 
These changes were associated with low wage 
spread within each com pany’s in ternal call 
centers and  allowed m anagers to distribute 
calls m ore flexibly betw een locations and 
agen t groups.
Second, all o f the com panies adopted  
scheduling arrangem ents that provided m an­
agers with m ore flexibility to adjust em ploy­
m en t levels to daily and  seasonal fluctuations 
in call volume, while giving workers some 
contro l over the ir working time. T-Com and  
T-Mobile negotia ted  working tim e accounts 
with the ir works councils in the early 2000s, 
which allowed em ployees to build  up  hours 
in the ir accounts w hen call volum e was high, 
and  th en  draw down those hours when they 
needed  extra time off. Employee control over 
these arrangem ents was strongest at T-Com: 
works agreem ents specified th a t team  lead­
ers could n o t force agents to work overtim e 
or prevent agents from  leaving w hen they 
chose if they had  sufficient “p lus” hours. As 
a result, team  leaders relied on m ain tain ing 
a good relationsh ip  with their team  to avoid 
staffing problem s. A rcor and  Vodafone did 
n o t have working tim e accounts, b u t this 
was in p a rt due to works councils’ percep­
tion th a t m anagers would take advantage
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of these arrangem ents. At Arcor, the works 
council had  gradually im proved scheduling 
predictability and  helped  individual workers 
to secure favorable shifts based on needs 
such as child care, while Vodafone em ployees 
were able to refuse requests by m anagers to 
change th e ir shifts.
T h ird , new perfo rm an ce  m anag em en t 
practices relied  on developm ental form s of 
m otivation th rough  coaching and  train ing 
ra th e r than  discipline and  dismissals. Works 
councils placed strict, negotiated  limits on 
individual m onito ring  and  incentives. These 
limits were strongest at T-Com and  T-Mobile, 
where works agreem ents p roh ib ited  m anag­
ers from  record ing  individual perform ance 
metrics, disciplining individual workers based 
on th e ir perfo rm ance, or basing variable pay 
on individual sales goals. At Arcor, works 
agreem ents also p roh ib ited  individual m oni­
toring, with the exception of call length; and 
“mystery calls” evaluating service quality were 
rep o rted  only at the team  level. Vodafone 
allowed mystery calls to be rep o rted  at the 
agen t level, b u t individual results were only 
available to several “tra in ers” at each cen ter 
who could only use these data to give em ploy­
ees feedback and  coaching. Coaching was 
described by m anagers and  works councilors 
as a negotiation  ra th e r than  evaluation, as 
team  leaders had restricted ability to th reaten  
po o r perfo rm ers with hard  consequences, 
such as dismissal.
F o u rth , all fo u r  co m p an ies  a d o p te d  
team -based work organization and  incen­
tives— encouraged  in large p a rt by these 
negotia ted  limits on  individual m onitoring. 
At T-Com and  T-Mobile, evaluations of team  
perfo rm ance  de te rm in ed  the distribu tion 
o f variable pay. At T-Com, this was overseen 
by a com m ittee at each workplace with an 
equal n u m ber o f em ployee and  em ployer 
representatives. In  addition , sales goals for 
each team  were incorpo ra ted  in to  a collec­
tive agreem ent, and  em ployees were able to 
appeal these goals before a jo in t com m ittee. 
Teams at A rcor’s call centers were responsible 
for providing “team  rep o rts” tha t identified 
g roup  goals and  suggestions for im proving 
systems. Employees in each team  were as­
signed a coaching role, and  variable pay 
was d istribu ted  by team  leaders as a bonus
on top of base pay. At Vodafone, team s had  
weekly and  m onthly sales goals, and  m anag­
ers organ ized  special team  com petitions 
and  bonuses. At all o f the com panies, th ere  
was a strong focus on bu ild ing “team  sp irit,” 
with regular team  m eetings, workshops, and  
train ing  sessions, as well as activities p lan n ed  
together outside o f work.
These em ploym ent practices re inforced  
one another: limits on m onitoring, com bined 
with b road  contro l by em ployees over th e ir  
working time, m ade it difficult to pursue 
individualized, discipline-based strategies for 
m otivating workers. Employees ado p ted  a 
m ore professional a ttitude toward th e ir jobs, 
encouraged  by the ir b road  autonom y an d  a 
strong “occupational identity” fostered  by 
appren ticesh ip  tra in ing  in a sales or adm in­
istrative profession. Works councils played 
an im portan t role in placing these negotiated  
limits on the possible range o f m anagem en t 
practices, as well as ensuring  som e fairness in 
the im plem entation  o f new incentives such 
as variable pay.
Participatory practices were fu rth e r sup­
po rted  by high and  un iform  wage levels 
and  jo b  security, secured th ro ug h  collective 
bargaining with ver.di at DT and  IG M etall 
at A rcor and  Vodafone. U nion agreem ents 
were strongest at T-Com, with h igh er pay 
across call cen ter jobs and  jo b  security p ro ­
visions. However, un io n  agreem ents at the 
o th e r com panies had  also he lped  to reduce  
in te rna l inequality and  raise overall pay, 
collapsing often com plicated structures o f 
individual contracts and  varied pay grades 
th a t were the legacy o f m ergers and  spin-offs 
in to  a sim pler structure  with less variation. 
For exam ple, A rcor was fo rm ed  by a series o f 
m ergers betw een o.tel.o, germ any.net, an d  a 
n u m ber o f sm aller city carriers. In 2003, IG 
Metall and  T ransnet finally concluded  a col­
lective agreem ent for the com pany’s new call 
cen ter subsidiary th a t collapsed 16 d ifferen t 
em ploym ent contracts from  these m ergers 
in to  two contracts, while ensuring  th a t no  
em ployees were assigned a lower pay grade.
Organizational Restructuring
T he above com parison dem onstrates th a t 
w orker representatives played an im p o rtan t
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role in encouraging large telecom m unica­
tions firms to invest in em ploym ent systems 
that relied on w orker skills and  involvem ent 
to im prove productivity in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. However, in recen t years, 
employers have adop ted  in parallel a set of 
externalization strategies th a t have u n d er­
m ined m any o f these gains. O utsourcing 
and the creation  o f new subsidiaries are two 
increasingly popu lar organizational restruc­
turing m easures tha t involve shifting some 
portion of corew ork—or, alternatively, entire 
departm ents or establishm ents— to a new 
organization, thus entailing  a renego tiation  
of em ploym ent contracts and  collective bar­
gaining agreem ents. These organizational 
changes have led to increased variation in 
pay and working conditions and  declin ing 
coord ination  betw een works councils across 
establishm ents.
Outsourcing. Large telecom m unications 
firms rely on third-party subcontractors to 
perform  technician, retail, and  call cen ter 
work. DT traditionally used subcontractors 
to handle peaks in dem and for technicians, 
bu t increasingly uses them  for regular work. 
For exam ple, in N ordrhein-W estfalen, the 
com pany’s largest adm inistrative reg ion , 
DT em ployed 1,800 in-house technicians 
and 1,200 ex ternal technicians th ro ug h  its 
subcontractors in 2007. These subcontractors 
were used prim arily to handle  simple jobs, 
such as installation; were n o t used for large 
business accounts; and  were m ore likely to 
be assigned to jobs o rdered  from  com peti­
tors who resell services on  D T’s network. At 
Arcor, subcontractors em ployed a roun d  half 
of the technicians servicing the com pany’s 
network. Again, these em ployees ten ded  to 
perform  m ore rou tine  o r lower-skilled jobs, 
bu t A rcor was using them  for an increasing 
p roportion  o f technician work in all areas.
T he organization of retail establishm ents 
is m ore decentralized: large firms typically 
both own th e ir own retail stores and  rely on 
franchises o r third-party chain stores to sell 
products and  services. In 2007, DT owned 
600 stores em ploying over 4,000 sales workers. 
These were m oved to a subsidiary, “T-Punkt,” 
in 2004, b u t the new com pany was covered 
by a collective agreem ent and  prim arily em ­
ployed workers with appren ticesh ip  train ing 
in retail sales. Em ploym ent was less regulated 
in the third-party stores th a t sold DT services, 
which were n o t covered by the DT agree­
m en t and  ten ded  to rec ru it m ore students 
o r o ther em ployee groups th a t lacked form al 
qualifications. Vodafone G erm any owned 
240 o f its own stores in 2007, bu t had over 
1,000 franchises, or “p artn e r stores,” tha t 
em ployed close to 3,000 em ployees and were 
n o t covered by V odafone’s collective agree­
m en t with IG Metall.
A similar tren d  can be seen in call cen ter 
operations. Several com panies, including 
T-Online and  the m obile provider E-plus, 
ou tsourced a m ajority o r all o f their call 
cen ter work, and  o thers ou tsourced peaks 
in call volum e o r certain  lower-skilled jobs 
such as op era to r services. T-Com outsourced 
m ost o f its d irectory  assistance jobs in the late 
1990s, and  T-Mobile gradually increased the 
ou tsourcing o f calls du ring  late hours, peak 
times, vacations, n igh t shifts, and  ou tb oun d  
cam paigns. By 2007, according to DT works 
councilors, a roun d  7,000 of T-Com’s call 
cen ter jobs were perfo rm ed  by subcontrac­
tors. D uring this same tim e period, Arcor 
increased ou tsourcing o f call volume peaks, 
late-night calls, o u tb oun d  cam paigns, and 
all d irectory  assistance work. U nion offi­
cials estim ated th a t close to 90% of A rcor’s 
“sim ple” o r transactional call cen ter jobs 
were perfo rm ed  externally, while m anagers 
re tra ined  the in terna l work force to focus 
on m ore com plex technical service jobs and 
high-value-added custom er segm ents.
Works councils and  un io n  representatives 
initially cooperated  with these m easures, as 
they were viewed as a useful escape valve for 
pressures to reduce labor costs or ex tend  
service to unsocial working hours (Doellgast 
2008). For exam ple, in 2000, V odafone’s 
works council agreed to allow m anagem ent 
to outsource peaks in call volum e and  some 
telem arketing  cam paigns in exchange for 
strong jo b  security protections. However, out­
sourcing often created  new and  u nexpected  
pressures. Vodafone began to outsource all 
new growth in call volume ra ther than expand 
em ploym ent in-house. In-house workers 
were benchm arked  against subcontractors, 
increasing pressure on works councilors to im­
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prove productivity and  allow m ore individual 
perfo rm ance  m onitoring. Ver.di negotiated  
a special ag reem ent in 2006 with T-Mobile 
th a t included  pay at risk and  reduced  starting 
pay for new hires in call centers, following an 
em otional cam paign in which m anagem ent 
th rea ten ed  to ou tsource all custom er service 
jobs if the ag reem ent was no t accepted.
T he growing use of subcontractors for 
form erly core telecom m unications jobs has 
m oved thousands of these jobs to com panies 
th a t are typically n o t covered by un ion  agree­
m ents. Only one large call center subcontrac­
tor, W alter Services, negotiated an agreem ent 
with ver.di, and  this was considerably weaker 
than  those th a t covered the workers o f its 
m ajor clients, including DT (Holst 2008). 
W hile large subcontractors often have works 
councils, they tend  to be newer, to have weaker 
relationships with unions, and  to have little 
con tact with the works councils o f client 
com panies. These com panies also typically 
pay lower wages, m onito r work m ore in ten ­
sively, dem and  g reater scheduling flexibility 
from  th e ir workers, and  rely m ore heavily on 
com m ission and  pay at risk.
Subsidiary creation. An alternative set of 
restru c tu rin g  m easures involves moving in­
terna l departm en ts o r en tire  jo b  categories 
to subsidiaries. Similar to outsourcing, this 
is an organizational change tha t allows firms 
to re-negotiate collective agreem ents. Subsid­
iary creation  has n o t been  a m ajor elem ent 
o f restruc tu ring  at A rcor or Vodafone. W hen 
A rcor and  o.tel.o m erged in the late 1990s, 
A rcor b rou gh t together their call centers into 
a new company, M annesm ann C ustom er O p­
erations (M CO), and  negotiated  a separate 
ag reem ent for these workers. However, the 
subsidiary was subsequently b rou gh t back 
within A rcor in 2003, at the same time tha t 
the com pany began downsizing em ploym ent 
due to increased use o f subcontractors for 
call cen ter jobs. D eutsche Telekom  has been  
m ost aggressive in adop ting  this strategy 
for bo th  fixed netw ork and  m obile opera­
tions— due in p art to its size and  strong jo b  
security agreem ents tha t lim it o th er form s 
o f externalization.
In M arch 2004, DT established two new 
subsid iaries, V ivento C ustom er Services
(VCS) and Vivento Technical Services (VTS), 
to handle lower-skill call cen ter and  technical 
support work across DT, as well as to provide 
subcontracted  services to external clients. 
These new businesses were form ed due to 
D T ’s u n iq u e  em ploym en t com m itm ents. 
Between 1995 and  2004, D eutsche Telekom  
cut 110,000 positions in its core operations, 
largely th rough  early re tirem ent, voluntary 
buy-outs, and  natural turnover. R ed un dan t 
em ployees who could n o t be accom m odated 
th rough  these m easures were moved in to  
Vivento Personal Service A gentur (PSA), a 
“tem porary  em ploym ent and  qualification 
com pany” or Beschaftigungsgesellschaftc rea ted  
in 2002 th a t was in ten d ed  to place em ployees 
in short-term  assignm ents within and  outside 
o f DT. By 2003, Vivento PSA had  grown to 
close to 20,000 em ployees, whom  DT was ob­
ligated to m aintain at the ir fo rm er pay level.
VCS and  VTS were established to ta rge t 
new m arkets using this surplus work force, 
and  over 4,000 em ployees were m oved to the 
two subsidiaries from  Vivento PSA. U n d er 
the 2004 collective agreem ent, the new sub­
sidiaries rem ained  u n d e r the DT agreem ent, 
although  pay was reduced  to 91.25% o f em ­
ployees’ fo rm er salaries. W hile em ployees 
transferred  from  o th e r DT com panies were 
able to keep their em ploym ent contracts, new 
em ployees were h ired  u n d e r less favorable 
term s. For exam ple, the starting m onthly 
salary at VTS was 1,900 Euros in 2006 com ­
pared  to 2,300 Euros for T-Com’s in-house 
technicians. By 2007, DT was con tracting  a 
po rtion  o f its “ou tso u rced” call cen ter and  
technical service work to VCS and  VTS.
Ver.di representatives were initially op ti­
mistic that the Vivento com panies would allow 
DT to in-source thousands ofjobs p erfo rm ed  
by vendors. However, m anagem ent soon 
m ade it clear th a t it in ten d ed  to sell the new 
subsidiaries. Between 2006 and  2008, DT 
transferred  12 o f its 19 VCS establishm ents, 
represen ting  a roun d  1,800 em ployees, to the 
subcontractors W alter Services and  Arvato. 
It also established Vivento In terim  Services 
as a separate tem porary  staffing com pany 
in 2006, which was subsequently transferred  
to a jo in t ven ture with M anpower in 2007. 
Finally, DT established a strategic partnersh ip  
agreem ent with Nokia Siemens Networks tha t
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led to the operational transfer o f 1,600 VTS 
employees in 2008.
The sale o f the Vivento establishm ents 
dem onstrated  m anag em en t’s increased will­
ingness to ou tsource technician and  service 
jobs. However, in contrast to D T ’s form er 
outsourcing strategies, these m easures shifted 
form erly core workers (and ver.di m em bers) 
to firms with weaker o r no  collective agree­
ments. This p resen ted  a new set of challenges 
for ver.di’s telecom m unications departm ent, 
FB9, as it sought to support its m em bers 
who were transferred  to call cen ter vendors. 
Call cen ter em ployees transferred  to Arvato 
(owned by the notoriously anti-union con­
glom erate Bertelsm ann) had  the term s of 
their existing collective agreem ent secured 
th rough 2009, and  m anagers have indicated  
that they will ask em ployees to sign individual 
contracts at a lower level when the agreem ent 
expires. U nion and works council represen ta­
tives were in fo rm ed tha t pay would average 
€25,000 a year, with m ore than  a th ird  o f tha t 
am ount paid directly by D eutsche Telekom; 
however, this “top-up” is secured only for 
five years. In  addition , working tim e will be 
increased to 40 hours from  38, and  o ther 
form er perks, such as vacation time, will be 
cut. Ver.di is encouraging em ployees n o t to 
sign the new contracts, and  instead seeking to 
pressure Arvato m anagem ent to negotiate a 
collective agreem ent, using leverage from  its 
m em bers in the fo rm er VCS locations w here 
m em bership density rem ains at a roun d  40 %. 
Predictably, it is facing steep resistance from  
m anagem ent, which has inform ally th rea t­
ened to move work to o th er locations (with 
weaker un io n  support) if em ployees refuse 
to sign individual contracts.
Ver.di faces a d ifferen t set o f challenges 
at the VCS locations th a t were transferred  
to W alter Telem edien. W alter was the only 
m ajor call cen ter vendor to negotiate a col­
lective agreem ent with ver.di, b u t the price 
for this was a “com petitive” wage rate for the 
industry: the agreem ent set m inim um  hourly 
pay at €5.11, with an additional perform ance- 
based com p onen t o f € 1 -2 . W hen W alter 
purchased the new locations from  DT, the 
employees were autom atically transferred  to 
this existing agreem ent, based on a provision 
in G erm an law th a t provides an exception
to transfer o f undertak ings rules w hen bo th  
firms are covered by agreem ents with the 
same u n io n .11 W alter’s ag reem ent had  been 
negotia ted  and  adm inistered  by a d ifferen t 
d ep artm en t w ithin ver.di, FBI 3— against the 
resistance o f ver.di representatives in the 
telecom m unications dep artm en t FB9. This 
m eant tha t em ployees who had  form erly 
ea rn ed  an average annual salary o f €33,000 
saw the ir pay cut by a roun d  a th ird. W alter’s 
collective ag reem en t exp ired  at the end  
of 2007, at which tim e ver.di sought a new 
agreem ent at its p re fe rred  m inim um  wage o f 
€7 .50. However, W alter refused to consider 
an agreem ent at this level, arguing tha t doing 
so would pu t it at a disadvantage in com peting 
for clients with non-un ion  subcontractors.
F u rth er conflicts were sparked by D T’s 
an n o u n cem en t in 2007 tha t it p lanned  to 
shift 50,000 o f its technical service, technical 
in frastructu re, and  call cen ter jobs to th ree  
new subsidiaries (to be called “T-Service”), 
coupled  with the dem and  tha t ver.di renego­
tiate pay and  working conditions. Ver.di led 
a six-week strike— the first in the history of 
the com pany—with strong support from  its 
m em bership . Despite this show o f strength, 
the un io n  faced a n u m ber o f challenges in 
build ing bargaining power in negotiations. 
Ver.di’s m em bers initially sought to use their 
position on the DT Aufsichtsrat to oppose 
the creation o f the subsidiaries, bu t were 
unsuccessful. O nce m anagem ent decided 
to go ahead  with the p lann ed  restructu r­
ing m easures, the un io n  was unable to use 
a strike to oppose these m easures u n d er 
G erm an law; it could legally strike only to 
p ro test the consequences o f such m easures for 
employees. In addition , m anagers p lann ed  
to move em ployees from  bo th  T-Mobile and 
T-Com in to  the subsidiaries, which they ar­
gued gave them  the legal righ t to adop t the
"Paragraph 613a from the Burgerlichen Gesetzbuchs 
(BGB) establishes that employees who are transferred 
to a new owner through the purchase or takeover of 
their company have the right to maintain their existing 
working conditions for a year. However, this does not 
apply when the new owner has an existing collective 
agreement with the same union as the former owner: 
in this case, employees are immediately transferred to 
the new agreement. See http://www.juraforum.de/ 
gesetze/BGB/613a/.
Table 4. Comparison of Call Center Pay Levels at Deutsche Telekom’s Subsidiaries and Major Vendors, 2006-2008.
Deutsche Telekom AG D T’s Major Call Center Vendors
T-Mobile
T-Com (2006) (2006)
Vivento Customer 
Services (VCS) 
(2006)
T-Service, DT Arvato Services 
Kundenservice Walter Services (CC/CRM) 
(2007) (2007) (2007)
Employment in CCs -18,000 -3,000 -3,000 -22,000 -7,000 -10,000
% Total Employment 21% 33% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Starting Salary -  €16,000 Not Available
Dir. Assistance €23,772 €20,435
Service (simple) €29,646 €20,435
Cust. Service €34,620 €27,660 Employees €23,490
Large Business €31,374 €32,088 transferred to €26,545
Vivento retain -  €18,000 -€ 1 8 ,0 0 0Average Salary 
Dir. Assistance €28,470 their previous €22,478 (€25,000
Service (simple) €33,264 salary level, with €22,478 planned,
Cust. Service €37,392 €24,888 a reduction of €25,839o o n  i  n n former VCS)Large Business €35,564 €28,872 8.75% €^y,iyy
% Variable Pay -15-20% Not Available
Service and Sales 7% 10% 15%
Large Business €5323 (100%) €7260 (100%) 15%
€7985 (150%) €12,375 (150%)
Pay at Risk No No No Yes Yes Yes
Working Hours 34 38 38 38 40 40
Sources: Pay data from the DT companies and Walter Services are based on collective agreements and estimated averages from union and works council rep­
resentatives. Pay data from Arvato are based on estimated averages from works councilors.
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less favorable T-Mobile agreem ent w ithout 
fu rther negotiation  (particularly for the new 
call cen ter subsidiary). Finally, DT publicly 
th rea tened  to sell the service subsidiaries if 
it was unable to get a favorable agreem ent. 
This p u t ver.di in a weak, and  largely defen­
sive, bargain ing position.
U nder the agreem ent eventually reached  
by bo th  parties, wage levels for fo rm er T-Com 
employees m oved to T-Service were reduced  
by 6.5% over 42 m onths, and  weekly working 
time increased from  34 to 38 hours w ithout 
pay com pensation , am ounting  to an overall 
reduction in com pensation o f m ore than  
10%. In addition , new em ployees were to 
earn 30% below the fo rm er level; the use of 
variable pay increased, with 15% of base pay 
tied to D T’s organizational perform ance and 
individual and team  perform ance targets; and 
the regular working week was len g thened  to 
include Saturdays in call cen ter operations. 
M anagem ent agreed to ex tend  pro tection  
against com pulsory layoffs un til 2012, to 
refrain from  selling the new service subsid­
iaries un til 2010, and  to offer 4,150 jobs at 
T-Service to DT apprentices.
M anagem ent also used the restructu ring  
process as an opportun ity  to renego tiate  
works agreem ents on  a range of topics. For 
exam ple, DT was in troducing  GPS tracking 
systems and  began to discuss with its works 
councils the possibility of using this techno l­
ogy to m on ito r the m ovem ents o f individual 
technicians, resulting in a lim ited pilo t p roj­
ect. Because the agreem ent in trodu ced  pay 
at risk tied to perform ance, m anagem ent 
sought and  secured lim ited exceptions to 
works agreem ents th a t allowed supervisors 
to look at individual perfo rm ance metrics. 
Worker representatives also faced difficult ne­
gotiations over w hether the tim e technicians 
spent driving to the ir first assignm ent and 
hom e from  th e ir last assignm ent would be in­
cluded in em ployees’ official working hours. 
Both parties eventually resolved this with a 
com prom ise agreem ent allowing em ployees 
some lim ited use o f com pany-owned vehicles 
as com pensation for lost pay. These changes 
represen ted  a substantial reorganization  of 
work, characterized  by a shift to individual 
incentives and  increased m onitoring.
In addition , works councils accustom ed
to their distinct com pany “cu ltu res” were 
obligated to develop a new structure for 
decision-m aking and  com m unication . Call 
cen ter jobs from  bo th  T-Com and  T-Mobile 
were moved in to  the new subsidiary; and 
while T-Com’s works councils were organized 
on a regional basis and  dom inated  by ver.di 
m em bers, T-M obile’s works councils had  a 
workplace-based structure  and  weaker links 
to ver.di. Works councilors anticipated  that 
the in tegration  process would generate  con­
flicts in the sho rt term  and  divert resources 
from  negotiations over substantial p lanned  
changes in work organization. After a year 
within the new structure, local works councils 
were struggling to m ain tain  autonom y as 
m anagem ent sought increasingly to by-pass 
the local level and  negotiate agreem ents 
with the central works councils for each new 
company.
Summary. T he ou tsourcing and  subsidiary 
strategies discussed above fu rth e r eroded  al­
ready weak coordinated bargaining structures 
and  con tribu ted  to increased labor m arket 
segm entation and  downward pressure on 
wages within large firms. Pay level and  struc­
tu re for technician jobs were similar betw een 
DT and  Arcor, following the reductions in 
base pay and  in troduction  o f variable pay at 
DT: at T-Service, technicians in the lowest 
m ajor pay grade started  at €26,000, with an 
average salary o f a roun d  €35,000, and  top 
salaries close to €50,000 for senior special­
ists. At Arcor, the lowest pay grade started 
at €25,000, with an average salary of a round  
€33,000, and  a m axim um  of €43,000 for 
senior specialists.12 Table 4 com pares pay 
levels for call centers in D eutsche Telekom ’s 
subsidiaries and  m ajor vendors. This illus­
trates the large variation betw een in-house 
and  ou tsourced firm s perfo rm ing  largely 
sim ilar work, as well as the ex ten t o f po ten tial 
pay reduction  for D T ’s call cen ter workers as 
they are shifted from  T-Com to the subsidiar­
ies T-Service and  Vivento.
Conclusions
T he liberalization o f the G erm an telecom ­
12Pay rates based on collective agreements as of 2007.
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m unications m arket in the 1990s precip itated 
a nu m ber o f changes in industrial relations 
institutions and  m anagem ent strategies. T he 
industry today is characterized by increasingly 
fragm ented  collective bargaining structures, 
declin ing un ion  bargaining power, and grow­
ing variation in pay and  working conditions 
w ithin and  across firms. These developm ents 
are particu larly  strik ing w hen m easured  
against the in dustry ’s recen t history. Up 
to the mid-1990s, the industrial relations 
system was charac te rized  by encom pass­
ing bargain ing  structures, strong in terna l 
bargain ing coord ination , and  a trad ition  o f 
social partn ersh ip  (D arbishire 1997). O ut­
com es for workers included  relatively high 
and  egalitarian wages, p ro tection  againstjob  
loss and  erosion of working conditions, and  
substantial opportun ities to participate in 
m anagem en t decision-m aking.
T h ese  in s titu tio n s  qu ick ly  u n rav e led  
following the privatization o f DT and  the 
in troduction  o f com petition across m arket 
segm ents. W hile the DPG and  now ver.di 
have sought to establish closer relationships 
with works councils in new firms, they face 
considerable obstacles, including lack o f in­
terest o r cooperation  from  new employers, 
com petition  betw een unions, and  low m em ­
bership  density in new industry  segm ents. 
Today, collective bargaining in the G erm an 
telecom m unications industry  occurs at the 
com pany level, even within the DT corporate  
group, while works councils have displaced 
un ions as the prim ary, or only, form  of col­
lective represen ta tion  at D T ’s com petitors. 
M eanwhile, m anagers are reo rien ting  their 
investm ent strategies to increasingly price- 
com petitive  an d  d iffe ren tia ted  m arkets, 
at the same tim e as they seek to balance 
obligations to the ir existing work force with 
increased pressures to m aximize re tu rns to 
shareholders.
T he scope o f these changes in m arkets and 
institutions m akes the telecom m unications 
industry  a particularly useful case for exam ­
in ing con tem porary  change in the G erm an 
industrial relations system. First, the findings 
provide evidence th a t a substantial transfor­
m ation in bargaining structures and  un ion  
bargaining power is occurring  in Germany, 
on  a scale rem iniscen t o f U.S. developm ents
in the 1980s (for exam ple, Kochan e t al. 
1986). Industrial relations in the G erm an 
telecom m unications industry has un dergo ne  
what Erickson andK uruvilla (1998) describe 
as a fundam ental o r transform ative change, 
m easured in term s o f bo th  form al institutions 
and  the ir system effects. G erm any’s strong 
w orkplace-level co -de te rm in a tion  in s titu ­
tions have been  viewed as in te rd ep en d en t 
with (or com plem entary  to) industry-level 
bargain ing structures, distinctive financial 
in s titu tio n s  p ro v id in g  “p a tie n t c a p ita l ,” 
and  quality-focused com petitive strategies 
in in terna tion al m arkets (Hall and  Soskice 
2001)— all o f which have been  w eakened o r 
are absen t in this sector. In telecom m unica­
tions, the stability o f industrial relations also 
relied on a high degree o f m arket p ro tection . 
Political decisions at the EU and national level 
to liberalize telecom m unications m arkets 
have increased pressures on  firms to reduce  
costs, exacerbated  by changing ow nership 
patterns. These dynamics are n o t u n iq ue  to 
telecom m unications: many service industries 
in Germ any, such as postal services, utilities, 
tran sp o rta tio n  and  logistics, an d  hospitals, 
are cu rren tly  u n d e rg o in g  sim ilar changes 
in m arkets an d  ow nership , affecting  a large 
swath o f trad itionally  p ro tec ted  w orkplaces 
(B rand t e t al. 2008; K eune e t al. 2008). 
Across these sectors, ba rga in ing  coverage 
and  u n io n s’ capacity to coo rd in a te  b a rg a in ­
ing a t secto r level have dec lined , co n tr ib u t­
ing to grow ing wage inequality  (Bosch an d  
W einkopf 2008).
Second, the findings dem onstrate  th a t 
organizational restru c tu rin g  is a cen tral ele­
m ent o f firm  strategy th a t is being used to 
drive institutional change in Germany. T he 
case studies p resen ted  here  show th a t new, 
m ore netw orked or vertically d isin tegrated  
organizational form s constitute an im por­
tan t m echanism  th ro ug h  which m anagers 
are able to pursue transform ative change in 
em ploym ent systems. This represen ts w hat 
S treeckandT helen  (2005:31) term  “displace­
m e n t” as em ployers defect from  do m inan t 
arrangem ents, leading to the “cultivation 
o f a new ‘logic’ o f action inside an existing 
institutional setting .” Despite form al stabil­
ity in bargaining rights and  som e continuity  
in bargaining structures w ithin core firms,
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unions and  works councils are increasingly 
circum scribed in th e ir ability to influence 
working conditions outside this core. Even 
at DT, the use of subcontractors and  ren e­
gotiation o f contracts in subsidiaries have 
increased variation in em ploym ent systems 
across establishm ents and  across differen t 
groups o f em ployees in similar jobs. These 
trends are particularly p ron o u n ced  in tele­
com m unications, due to its history of single 
em ployer bargaining and  lack o f a sectoral 
agreem ent. However, they are also consistent 
with the findings o f recen t studies in o ther 
sectors. Processes o f vertical disintegration 
have w eakened coord inated  bargaining in 
the G erm an auto industry  (Doellgast and 
G reer 2007; G reer 2008a; Ju rg en s et al. 
2003), health  care sector (G reer 2008b), and 
logistics (Plehwe 2001). This suggests that 
the findings presen ted  here  may be rep re ­
sentative of b road er trends in the G erm an 
economy, whereby the growing am biguity 
of sectoral boundaries and  growth of new 
non-union or weakly un ion ized  sectors are 
m aking it increasingly difficult for industry- 
based unions to coordinate bargaining across 
com plex supply networks.
Several core features o f the traditional 
G erm an m od el have p e rs is ted  in  large  
telecom m unications firm s— m ost notably, 
in d ep en d en t firm- and  workplace-level co­
determ ination  structures and  “d u a l” voca­
tional train ing  arrangem ents. U nion and 
works council influence looks particularly 
strong w hen com pared to m ore liberal coun­
tries such as the U nited  States and  Australia, 
where bargaining rights have traditionally 
been weaker and  bargaining coverage has 
declined m ore dram atically over the past 
two decades (see the articles by Keefe and 
by Ross and  Bam ber in this issue). G erm an 
works councils’ form al role in m anagem ent 
decision-m aking is unlikely to be contested 
in the n ear fu tu re , as m anagers rely on
these bargaining structures to gain worker 
acceptance for, and  cooperation  with, new 
m easures th a t reorganize core jobs (B lutner 
et al. 2002). Em ployers also rem ain largely 
com m itted to the appren ticesh ip  train ing 
system, as appren tices are valued as a source 
o f relatively low-cost labor and  skills. How­
ever, this privileged core is shrinking as firms 
outsource work and  reduce the skill con ten t 
o f certain  jobs.
T ogether, these  find ings suggest th a t 
industrial relations institutions will play an 
increasingly circum scribed role in shaping 
m anagem ent strategy and  w orker outcom es 
in the G erm an telecom m unications industry. 
Reversing these trends would require re-estab­
lishing coord inated  bargaining, ideally across 
bo th  large firm s and  their subcontractors. 
The degree to which bargaining coverage 
and  coord ination  have declined in G erm any 
is in some respects un ique, and  linked to dis­
tinctive traditions o f Tarifautonomie, whereby 
em ployers and  un ions have broad  rights to 
negotiate collective agreem ents w ithout state 
in terven tion . T elecom m unications unions 
in o ther E uropean  countries with stronger 
state in te rv en tio n  in industria l rela tions 
have been  m ore successful in establishing 
industry-wide bargain ing  structures. For 
exam ple, in Belgium, France, and  Finland, 
m andatory  extension m echanism s require  
all firms in a sector to adhere  to agreem ents 
negotia ted  by m ajor em ployers, leading to 
100% bargaining coverage; and  in Austria, 
m andatory m em bership in employers associa­
tions plays a similar role (Traxler 2007:22). 
A bsent the developm ent o f new m echanism s 
in Germ any for extending m inim um  term s of 
em ploym ent, com petition between locations 
for investm ent will con tinue to u n derm ine  
the coo rd inated  bargaining institutions tha t 
have trad itio na lly  su p p o rted  egalita rian  
pay structures and  w orker participation  in 
restruc tu ring  decisions.
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